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In1970, 8.5 million households in the United States—one
in every eight—inhabited substandard housing as defined
by the Census, mostly rental housing.1 Yet, as long ago as
1949, Congress had established a national goal of "a decent and
suitable living environment for every American We can
identify a number of legislative responses to this challenge, including
such federal programs as urban renewal, public housing, Model Cities,
and rent subsidies. In addition, and often in isolation, state legisla-
tures and the courts have instituted laws with the same purpose in
mind. These laws have sought to modify the venerable one-sided
relationship between landlord and tenant. Such modifications, be
they common law or statutory, have been along two major lines of
approach—habitability laws and continued tenure laws.
A substantial literature exists on landlord-tenant relations, but
little work has been done to examine the economic implications of
housing laws on landlords and tenants.3 In this study, we provide a
model for the evaluation of the costs and benefits of various
habitability laws. In particular, we will evaluate laws on repair and
rent deduct, receivership, rent withholding, and rent abatement, as
well as laws for combating retaliatory eviction; all these are measures
that reduce the risk borne by the tenant in procuring housing. Our
objective is to determine the costs imposed by these laws and their
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We first present the major laws that regulate the relationship
between landlord and tenant. We then offer some concepts and
definitions designed to facilitate the analysis of the impact of
habitability laws on rents paid by low-income groups. Next, we
examine the allocation process for housing services within a demand-
supply framework. We model the rental housing consumption
process as wellasthe supply process.Finally, we develop an
empirical methodology and present our results. In our empirical
work we use a data file on landlord-tenant legal relations specially
constructed by us and household data from the University of
Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics for 1968-1972.
LAWS
Historically,most of the American states have subscribed to the early
common law rule that landlords are under no duty to repair and
maintain residential premises leased to tenants4 or to deliver residen-
tial premises in a habitable condition. Moreover, since the rules of
property law solidified before the development of mutually depen-
dent covenants in contract law, a lessee's covenant to pay rent was
considered independent of the lessor's covenant to provide housing.
As a result, for example, if a tenant's home became uninhabitable,
even though it was through no fault of his own, he could neither
demand that repairs be made by the landlord nor escape liability for
the rent due for the remainder of the term. Thus, the tenant had to
pay rent regardless of whether he received any benefits from the
residential premises.
A major modification of this traditional common law landlord-
tenant relationship began soon after World War II. Basically, two
approaches have been pursued, mainly through laws that assure
tenants habitable housing and, to a lesser extent, continued tenancy
(Hirsch et al. 1975).
In the first line of approach, many large American cities, by means
of housing codes, shifted to the landlord the responsibility for
repairing leased premises and maintaining them in habitable condi-
tion. The codes impose the burden of repair and maintenance on the
landlord, while placing responsibility for cleanliness of the dwelling
and specified minor items of maintenance on the tenant. Usually, the
owner remains ultimately responsible for having housing code viola-
tions corrected. Parallel to these housing codes and in furthering
their enforcement, courts and legislatures have created rights of
actions of tenants. To this end, a number of legal remedies have been
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tenants while concomitantly reducing those retained by landlords.
These remedies, designed to provide a minimum level of housing
quality to tenants, include repair and rent deduction, rent withhold-
ing and abatement, and receivership. They are often supplemented
by provisions that prohibit retaliatory eviction, facilitate return of
the tenant's security deposit, and legalize rent strikes. Furthermore,
courts have recently begun to imply a warranty of habitability into
urban residential leases.5
These recent changes in landlord-tenant relations, by implying and
extending a warranty of habitability, automatically revise the doc-
trine of caveat emptor. Since certainty about the law has declined,
previously nonexistent legal risks have arisen and the distribution of
risks between landlord and tenant has been altered. For example, in
the presence of caveat emptor, the landlord's obligations to repair
and maintain premises are clear and, therefore, he faces few risks
regardless of how little repair and maintenance he provides. At the
same time, tenants face many risks, all of which change when the
doctrine of caveat emptor is modified.
Without a warranty of habitability, there is considerable potential
for variation in the level of service delivered to the tenant. Thus, the
tenant's lease agreement is, for him, a source of risk. There are two
sources of that variability:
First, there is the risk that the tenant has not correctly assessed
the attributes of the dwelling before leasing. Here, the law would
appear to economize on the cost of acquiring information, since the
landlordisin the best position to evaluate his own property.
Therefore, the law may be seen as requiring more complete dis-
closure of information, so that the tenant cannot claim that services
he might reasonably have expected under the lease were not
forthcoming.
Second, there is the risk that some damage to the dwelling will
occur and reduce the flow of services during the period of the lease.
When a habitability law is passed, the risk is transferred from tenant
to landlord. In the absence of such a law, the tenant would be
responsible for repair if he wished to derive the full benefits from his
residence. To the extent that maintenance can vary, the tenant's
consumption is subject to risk. Under the habitability law, risk is
transferred to the landlord, whose profit is now subject to the
variability of maintenance expenditures. The transfer of risk does
raise serious questions as to who is the efficient risk bearer. Since the
landlord may control many units, he therefore may have a smaller
expected variation per unit. On the other hand, if the landlord's
assets are specialized in housing, the total risk he bears may representpremises andd
remedy wasav
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184 Measuring Prices and Quantities in the Housing Market
arelatively large part of his total wealth. The poor tenant may be less
averse to risk than the wealthier landlord. Thus, there seems to be no
clear a priori basis for determining whether landlord or tenant will
have a larger evaluation of the cost of avoiding the risk associated
with the rental dwelling unit.
Let us next examine the major habitability laws. In Table 6-1, we
indicate which laws were in force in early 1972 in the twenty-five
states included in our sample.
Repair and deduct laws offer tenants a self-help remedy by







Deduct Withholding Receivership Eviction
Alabama no no no no
Arizona no no no no
California yes no no yes
Colorado no no no no
Washington, D.C. no yes no yes
Florida no no no yes
Georgia yes yes no no
Illinois no yesa yes yes
Indiana no no no no
Kansas no no no no
Kentucky no no no no
Louisiana yes no no no
Maryland no yes no .yes
Massachusetts no yes yes yes
Michigan no yesa yes no
Mississippi no no no no
Missouri no yes yes no
New Jersey yes yes yes yes
New York no yesa yes yes
Ohio no no no no
Oregon no no no no
Pennsylvania no yes no • yes
South Carolina no no no no
Texas no no no no
Washington no no no no
aWèlfare departments are authorized to withhold rent.Habitability Laws and Low-Cost Rental Housing185
premisesand deduct repair charges from their rent.6 By 1972, this
remedy was available in four states in our sample. It is basically
limited to relatively minor defects.7 Wide application of this remedy
in a large multiple-unit dwelling could be inefficient compared to the
result if the landlord undertook the repair and benefited from scale
economies.
A second form of remedy is rent withholding, through either
escrow or rent abatement. In the first case, the tenant pays rent into
a court-created escrow account. Rental income is withheld from the
landlord until violations are corrected.8 illinois, Michigan, and New
York even authorize rent withholding by the state welfare depart-
ment or some other agency. An alternative is rent abatement, which
is more consistent with the application of contract rather than
property law principles.9Rent abatement permits the tenant to
remain in possession of the premises without paying rent or by
paying a reduced amount until the housing defects are remedied. The
condition of the premises constitutes a defense either to an action of
eviction or to an action for rent. In most situations, the actual
differences between withholding and abatement are very small. Even
under abatement, rent is usually also placed into escrow, either as a
good faith gesture by the tenant or because courts so order pending a
full investigation of the existence and correction of code violations.
Therefore, in this paper we lump abatement and withholding to-
gether as withholding laws. By 1972, such laws were in existence in
ten of the states included in our sample.
A third remedy is receivership, i.e., appointment by the court of a
receiver who takes control of buildings and who corrects hazardous
defects, after the landlord has failed to act within a reasonable
period. By 1972, this remedy had become available in six of the
states included in our sample. If large-scale repairs are needed and
cannot be financed through rental payments, some statutes permit
the receiver to seek additional loans. When this is done, old first liens
are converted into new second liens, imposing particularly heavy
costs on lenders and, therefore, ultimately on landlords. Initiation of
receivership is usually preceded by a hearing in which the court
determines whether the landlord has failed to provide essential
services.If the court so rules, the rent is deposited with the
court-appointed receiver until the violation is corrected. As long as
the tenant. continues to pay rent into escrow, his landlord cannot
evict him for nonpayment.
Altogether, courts increasingly imply warranties of fitness and
habitability in urban residential leases. This implied warranty of



































J186 Measuring Prices and Quantities in the Housing Market
actionsfor rent, if the tenant is able to show that a "substantial"
violation of the housing code existed during the period rent was
withheld. In addition, the tenant may have an affirmative cause of
action against the landlord for breach of contract, while remaining
liable for the reasonable value of the use of the premises.
Of the three remedies listed, receivership is potentially the most
costly to the landlord. It results in a complete stoppage of rental
income to him, since all tenants in the building, not only the
aggrieved ones, pay rentsinto escrow. Moreover, the landlord
altogether loses control over his building. Instead, control is tempo-
rarily transferred to a receiver who may be enthusiastic about fixing
up the building, 'possibly even above minimum standards established
by housing codes. The repair decisions are thus made without due
consideration of their potential profitability. Finally, contrary to
most repair and deduct and withholding laws, receivership is usually
initiated by government, which has vast legal resources behind it.
The three major remedies are often supplemented by laws that can
reinforce them. One is retaliatory eviction, which is designed to
protect tenants from being penalized by landlords for complaining
against housing code violations. Such laws, which usually freeze rents
for ninety days after compliance, existed in 1972 in nine states of
our sample. Furthermore, a number of states have laws that facilitate
the return of the tenant's security deposit at the end of the tenancy.
Finally, a few states have legalized rent strikes by tenants against a
particular landlord.1 0
Lawsthat prohibit retaliatory eviction, facilitate return of the
tenant's security deposit, and legalize rent strikes, like the other
three remedies, impose costs on landlords.. Parts of these costs may
result' from reduced flexibility given landlords, ,imposition of high
repair and maintenance levels, and possibly legal costs. Of these
remedies, retaliatory eviction laws resembling temporary rent con-
trols tend to be the most costly to landlords.
In addition to these habitability laws, state legislatures have begun
to pursue a second line of approach by assuring tenants continued
tenancy, mainly through just-cause eviction statutes.'' Under the
latter, tenants can only be evicted for just cause, which is explicitly
stipulated in the legislation. For example, such statutes in New
Jersey (New Jersey Stats. 1974) delineate a limited number of legal
grounds which would constitute the sole basis for eviction: failure to
pay rent; disorderly conduct; willful damage or injury to the
premises; breach of express covenants; continued violation of land-
lord's rules and regulations; landlord wishes to retire permanently; or
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been cited for substandard housing violations and it is economically
unfeasible for the owner to eliminate the violations.
Like habitability laws, just-cause eviction statutes reduce the
property rights of landlords, particularly their flexibility in renting
out their apartments. We do not deal with just-cause eviction statutes
in this paper, but we note that such laws impose costs on landlords
both because the statutes extend the warrant of habitability and its
enforcement and because tenants assured of continued occupancy
can feel free to use allavailable legal remedies to obtain from
landlords relatively high levels of repair and maintenance.
Habitability laws can be viewed as rules of contract that change
the nature of the permissible contract. One simple interpretation is
that the habitability law constrains actors to contracts in which the
landlord bears the risks associated with repair and maintenance,
while without that law the form of the contract is not constrained. If
such an interpretation were correct, then a strong a priori case could
be made for the inefficiency of habitability laws. However, it is
equally likely that under caveat emptor, the consumer is constrained
from purchasing a desired bundle of housing services that includes
warranties. Such would be the case if high transaction costs inter-
fered with an efficient reallocation of rights. The reasons are that
deviations from a standard contract are costly and enforcement of
any warranties purchased would be difficult under general applica-
tion of caveat emptor. Finally,it may be that a contract that
obligates the landlord to maintain the premises is efficient and has
already evolved as the standard relationship between landlord and
tenant, and that the habitability law merely provides legal recogni-
tion of this so as to reduce enforcement costs. These alternative
interpretations each imply a different conclusion regarding the
efficiency of habitability laws, and therefore provide the motivation
for the empirical investigation undertaken below.' 2
CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
Of centralimportance in the housing market analysis is the time
period allowed for landlords and tenants to respond to changes in
prices or other circumstances. Thus, attention must be given to the
time .penod relevant to housing demand and supply. Clearly, the
answers to hypothetical questions such as how much housing a group
of households would consume at different rents, and how many
rental units a group of landlords would put on the market at
different rents, will depend on the amount of time that the decision
maker has to react to changes. For example, if prices go up, by188 Measuring Prices and Quantities in the Housing Market
tomorrowthe landlord can offer for rent only the units he owns since Upgrading
today; by next year, he can acquire facilities and convert them to a down of highe
particular application. At present, there appear to be two polar willbe
treatments of the supply of housing in the legal literature, an maintenance d
extreme long-run case by Komesar (1973) and a short-run case by mental factors
Ackerman (1971). itIS not
The time period has a bearing on the expected distribution of
costs. Thus, for example, traditional long-run models provide an easy structures vary,
answer to questions about the distribution between landlord and units has no b
tenant of costs that might result from compliance with additional seeking a housj
housing laws. In the competitive case with infinite time to make by varying eit
adjustments by means of new construction, the supply of housing is quantity of hoi
a horizontal or near-horizontal line at the price equal to the cost of of dwelling uni
providing housing services (de Leeuw 1974). Thus, in this simple primarily by
case,the supply shifts upward to reflect the additional costs form of adjus
associated with the law. The effect on rental price is then equal or observed that t
approximately equal to the change in costs. This would occur has will have ai
whether or not any benefits were received by the tenant. The and on the
traditional long-run case leaves us with only the question of evaluat- within the area
ing the benefits and costs. The distribution of costs is unambiguous, relates to the
i.e., the tenant pays all additional costs. quality of routi]
However, this absolute long-run model, while perhaps useful for In summary,
analyzing investment decisions,isless than satisfactory for our effects of a cha
analysis of housing markets. One of the aspects of housing that particularly the
qualifiesitfor a more distinct analysis is the durability of the quasi-long-run r
commodity. For assets as long lived as housing structures,full completely free
adjustment to a change in environment may take more time than any mainly housing
particular set of circumstances lasts. The durability of housing We turn now
structures leads to a second approach to the problem, where the Above, we used
supply of housing is treated as being perfectly inelastic. For example, ally understood
in Ackerman, the assumption is made that the structures are in place goodness or bad
and that they will be rented at some price rather than allowed to is somehow "I
remain vacant. If a new law results in losses, the properties are simply quality unit of
revalued downward with a once-over loss to the landlord; but the too vague and,
property will remain in the rental market.' dwelling, be it
This short-run model might be applied to certain pricing decisions, distinct econom
but it begs most of the important questions of concern to us. Clearly, are variationsii
if we assume no possible reaction by landlords, we will have no individual occur
trouble concluding that the landlords' reactions will not lead to ities and
higher rents. It can, however, be argued that changes in the number characteristics
of units will be small in the short run. This is particularly true for better conditior
low-quality housing, if the appropriate response of supplies to the service (Muth
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Habitability Laws and Low-Cost Rental Housing189
sinceupgrading to a higher quality is often quite expensive. Filtering
down of higher-quality categories may be curtailed, but the effect
will be small, sinceitis the consequence of construction and
maintenance decisions made many years in the past and of environ-
mental factors not under the control of landlords. For these reasons,
itis not unrealistic to define, for the purpose of analysis here, a
quasi-long-run period in which both the number and character of
structures vary, but in which adjustment in the construction of new
units has no bearing on the stock of low-quality structures. We are
seeking a housing quality model that will allow the landlord to react
by irarying either housing quality or, as we will show below, the
quantity of housing services, while not actually changing the number
of dwelling units. Such a change will occur for the low-quality range
primarily by varying the maintenance effort, which is the primary
form of adjustment in our quasi-long-run model.Itis widely
observed that the type of management that an apartment building
has will have an important impact on the quality of housing services
and on the neighborhood as well if management practices are similar
within the area (Stemlieb 1966). Much of the effect of management
relates to the making of needed repairs and the frequency and
quality of routine maintenance.
In summary, then, we will seek to build a model to evaluate the
effects of a change in the legal environment on the housing market,
particularly the low-cost rental housing market. It is a realistically
quasi-long-run model in which the total low-cost housing stock is not
completely free to vary, but other dimensions of landlords' behavior,
mainly housing quality changes, are unconstrained.
We turn now to the quantity and quality dimensions of housing.
Above, we used the word "quality" as we believe it to be convention-
ally understood; that is, as describing the essential character, the
goodness or badness, of the commodity. Thus, a higher-quality unit
is somehow "better," i.e., imparts greater service, than a lower-
quality unit of equivalent size. Nonetheless, such a definition is far
too vague and, to a degree, misleading. Any particular aspect of a
dwelling, be it paint, heat, size, location, etc., can be regarded as a
distinct economic commodity, and variations in these commodities
are variations in the amount of goods being consumed by the
individual occupying the dwelling. We aggregate over these commod-
ities and summarize by denoting as "housing services" all of those
characteristics taken together. Then a better dwelling, be it larger, in
better condition, or both, is said simply to deliver more housing
service (Muth 1969, and others). Given this definition, we can speak
of quality as being the amount of housing service contained in a190 Measuring Prices and Quantities in the Housing Market
dwelling.In particular, the decision by a landlord to provide high or istics in oursy
low quality in a particular dwelling is equivalent to the decision to hedonic pricea
provide more or less housing service, the variability
Having defined the commodity with which we are concerned, i.e., the
housing service, we turn next to the problem of measurement. respective chars
Measurement will be facilitated through the estimation of weights for observations wi
the components of housing service, as shown below, services receiv&
Rent payments represent a price multiplied by a quantity; in the we wis
market we observe expenditures rather than prices. For homogene- and excludevar
ous commodities, this problem is solved by simply dividing observed rooms, SoUfldne
expenditures by the quantity purchased. For housing there is no rent by the pro
easily observable quantity. Rental payments can be regarded as the by the characte
sum of payments for a number of characteristics, or, berg (1974) do
"hedonic value.
of market value
R. = (6-1) price per unit
i=1 housing service.
where R. is the rental payment for the jth dwelling unit, isthe It is useful at
price of i, and x.. if the quantity of the ith by others on he
ticcontained in the jth unit. The above represents a cross-cities setti
standard expression of the hedonic price approach. Unfortunately, hedonic price
this is not sufficient for our case. Hedonic prices represent outcomes proach is of no
of interactions of supply and demand. Because we are looking across explore the diff
cities, we have many supply and demand relationships and therefore of bt
we cannot expect uniform a housing services
result, we must depart from tI'ie usual approach in order to incorpo- We have not
rate those variables which enter the model through their differential prices. This qua]
effects on supply and demand across cities: that hedonic p:
opportunities
1 1974). In his se
,, (6-2) prices,the hed
information thai
whereis a factor determining the demands of the jth household no such argumel
and z.. is a factor determining the supply of housing in the city in prevail for all c
jth household is located. (The specific variables used will precludes the ol
be discussed below, where the supply and, demand processes are they might exist
treated.) Looking at rer
Assuming that the values of the characteristics are successfully in market supp
observed, what are the prices associated with individual observations variation in expe
for the analysis of supply and demand? The usual hedonic price thefirststep
approach would appear to summarize all prices, leaving us the same coefficients, in c
price for every unit in our set of observations. This difficulty is other variables.





























ing us the same
'his difficulty is
ts of character.
Habitability Laws and Low-Cost Rental Housing191
istics in our system are not prices, as they would be in the usual
hedonic price approach, but merely weightings that explain a part of
the variabilityin the observations of housing expenditures. In
particular, the products of the hedonic price coefficients times their
respective characteristics explain that part of the variability in the
observations which is due to variations in the quantity of housing
services received by each household. In evaluating prices for housing
services, we wish to include the variation due to supply and demand
arid exclude variation due, for example, to differences in number of
rooms, soundness of the building, etc. We can do this by dividing
rent by the product of the weighting from Equation (6-2) multiplied
by the characteristics present in an individual dwelling unit. Rothen-
berg (1974) does so, using actual rents, and calls the denominator
"hedonic value." Then the quotient, which he expresses as the ratio
of market value to hedonic value, is conveniently interpreted as the
price per unit of hedonic value or, simply, the price per unit of
housing service.
It is useful at this point to relate our formulation to current work
by others on hedonic prices. In particular, we wish to show how the
cross-cities setting that we must use is inconsistent with the usual
hedonic price approach. However, the inapplicability of that ap-
proach is of no importance to our efforts; our objective is not to
explore the different supply and demand environments for attributes
of dwellings but simply• to observe the supply and demand for
housing services in general.
We have noted that the coefficients of characteristics are not
prices. This qualification is not the same as the statement by Rosen
that hedonic prices are not literally prices, since there exist no
opportunities to tradecharacteristics at constant prices (Rosen
1974). In his setting, while the characteristics coefficients are not
prices,the hedonic price equations are argued to contain the
information that consumers and producers respond to. In this study
no such argument can be made. First, no set of characteristics prices
prevail for all cities. Second, the estimation process that we use
precludes the observation of marginal price relationships, although
they might exist within housing markets.' '
Lookingat residences in separate markets, we find that differences
in market supply and demand variables are a major source of
variation in expenditures for housing. To delete these variables from
thefirststep of the estimation would bias the characteristics
coefficients, in case characteristics were correlated with any of these
other variables. However, by including the market supply and
demand conditions in the equation, we remove the effect of these192 Measuring Prices and Quantities in the Housing Market
factorson those coefficients. Thus, the coefficients lose all similarity
to prices. This is desirable, since we are interested only in the relative
valuation generally placed on the characteristics by consumers.
We can demonstrate the constrasts of the two approaches with an
example. Let us say that a locality has, over time, depleted nearby
supplies of lumber. Consequently, increasing amounts are imported,
resulting in price increases. In the normal setting, this change would
require an increase in the price or evaluation of structural attributes
such as size, number of rooms, etc. In our setting, we would want the
weightings of these characteristics to be unchanged as a result of the
changing supplies of building materials. We want only to be able to
determine "how much house" is present in the first step of the
hedonic value computation. Later, we will use this information to
conclude that indeed "this much house" is more expensive in that
city, now that lumber is more costly, since we will observe a high
ratio of price to hedonic value for dwellings there.
The underlying motivation of the two different approaches ex-
plains the difference in methods. Rosen seeks to disaggregate total
payment by observing characteristics. We seek an aggregate measure
of value, but we can observe only the disaggregate values of the
characteristics, so we aggregate over these.
THEALLOCAT( ON PROCESS—SUPPLY AND DEMAND
Inthe above, we discussed two of the problems that are usually
identifiedas sources of difficulty in dealing with housing: the
problem of measurement and the durability of the housing stock. A
further consideration is market structure.
Though we may speak in terms of homogeneous "value units," the
consumer in fact is choosing among a set of heterogeneous commod-
ities. That is, each particular dwelling unit has a unique set of
attributes, especially with regard to its location. In fact, this has led
to the observation that each landlord is a monopolist for the
particular dwelling unit owned by him. In that case, no supply
function relating housing service to prices will exist. Yet, the housing
market is not monopolistic in the usual sense of the term; many
producers provide commodities that are close substitutes for one
another. It can be argued that under such circumstances the landlord
will tend to accept the highest bid for his dwelling unit and will
provide a package of housing attributes intended to maximize his
profits. Given these considerations, we can diagram the quantity
choice problem as presented in Figure 6-1.
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outputfor a perfectly discriminating monopolist or for determining
the net benefit maximizing output for a public agency. In short, the
landlord will provide additional services so long as the tenant's
marginal evaluation is greater than the marginal cost of the services.
In what follows, we provide a more detailed explanation of the
marginal cost and marginal evaluation functions. It is important to
note that these are not conventional supply and demand functions,
although they do reflect supply and demand processes. Furthermore,
they can be used in much the same way as conventional supply and
demand relationships to evaluate the market impact of housing laws.
MC, MRS
0
,Marginal cost (MC) ///
/
/I///
Quantity of housing services (HV1)
Figure 6.1.
The Housing Consumption Process
Theconsumption process of the household in this framework is
somewhat different from that, of traditional approaches. As discussed
earlier, market prices and variable quantities of a housing commodity
are not available to the household; thus, maximization of utility by
the household with a linear budget constraint, given market prices
and a level of income, is not possible.
Given the above derivation of a value measure and constraints on
market information, the household consumption problem can be
formulated as follows:
max X) subject to Y = + (6-3)F
194 Measuring Prices and Quantities in the Housing Market
where is the nonlinear housing value or total bid; HV1, a
measure of housing; X, all other goods in the market; Y, household
income; andprice of nonhousing commodities.
The solution to the above problems follows that shown first by
Alonso (1964) and later by Wheaton (1974) and Rosen (1974). The
bid-rent framework involves a production decision, which we assume
here to be given, and a consumption decision process. This process is
tractable given the information problem discussed above, and it can
be shown to have close theoretical ties with standard utility analy-
sis.'Given Equation (6-3), the solution to the choice quantity of
housing service is that point at which the household's marginal
rate of substitution for housing and other expenditures is equal to
the bid value for an additional value unit of housing.
In graphical terms, if e(HV; Y, 'y) expresses the "willingness-
to-pay" curves of a household, given income, a utility level (u*), and
personal attributes ('y), the optimal choice is at A (shown in Figure
6-2), where the household's marginal valuation equals the marginal
cost of housing service (HV1).
It should be noted that the bid-value curves hold income, the
P(HV), Ø(..)
0 HV'
Market price function [P(HV1)]
Consumers' equilibrium
bid
Quantity of housing services (HV)
Figure 6-2.Solution for Consumer.
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chosenlevel of houshold utility, and personal attributes constant.' 6
Assumptionsfor achieving a solution include a high degree of
independence in the bid-value process and convexity and regularity
of P(HV,). (These assumptions are not modified in this discussion.)
An interesting variable in the willinguess-to-pay function, 8 ,is the
set of personal. attributes, y. By varying y, different 8 curves can be
found for well-defined groups of individual households. By segment-
ing households in this way, the assumption can be eliminated that all
households have utility functions of the same form. An assumption
about personal attributes is stated later in this section.'
To interpret the bid-rent approach, the following factors are
relevant. Households are assumed to be making a kind of offer on
every rental housing unit that leaves them equally well off no matter
which offer is accepted. This is consistent with the choice of ain
the 8 function. Equilibrium is obtained when the values are such that
every unitisoccupied by the highest bidder. If an individual
household is the high bidder on more than one unit, it submits bids
which are lower for all units, again such that it is indifferent as to
which of the bids are accepted, thus obtaining a higher level of utility
than it obtained with the previous bids. The bidder who is not high
on any unit can reevaluate its needs and submit a set of higher bids,
thatis,itcan bid along a lower indifference curve, each bid
representing for it a choice between housing and nonhousing con-
sumption.
Within the above setting, we regard the household's decision-
making process as moving along an indifference curve as it exchanges
housing services for nonhousing consumption. Doing so, the house-
hold pays according to its marginal rate of substitution of housing
for other expenditures for each successive unit of housing service.
We assume that individuals with similar personal attributes can be
identified and that landlords are aware of these attributes and react
to them. (This view is not unrealistic, since landlords commonly do
have some expectations about the income, family size, and ages of
potential renters and tend to tailor their housing units to this
clientele.)
As described, an optimal bid-rent function for an individual
household will dependthe income and personal attributes of the
household and the level of bids of other households in the locality.
The bids of other households can be assumed to vary across cities
primarily by differences in income, thus giving a nonuniform set of
values. These values most likely reflect different marginal
cost curves, and therefore, no clear tracing of a housing supply curve
may result. This interaction could, however, be explained by the
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As described above, the observed value measure derived from the
ratio of rental value to hedonic value is an average evaluation, not a
marginal one. This does not, however, create an empirical problem,
but does require a different interpretation of regression coefficients.
Clearly, we can solve for a marginal evaluation, given a linear
relationship between average evaluation and quantity. The empirical
relationship to be estimated then becomes:
R.
household income, average income of other house-
J
holds in the SMSA, laws applying to the SMSA) (6-4)
where R. is the rent of the jth household and HV1 is the hedonic
value ofdwelling occupied by the jth household.
Supply
Havingintroduced the bid-rent process in the previous section, we
can demonstrate an analogous supply process quite briefly. Here, the
supplier is viewed as confronting a fixed price function an
assumption equivalent to the assumption that competitive firms
confront constant prices.Obviously, the assumption cannot be
literally true in either case, but probably reflects accurately the
supplier's perception that individually he has little influence on
market prices.
We can express the decision of the supplier as follows:
max 11= — D(M), L, B) (6-5)
where M is maintenance, D(M) relates maintenance to depreciation,
is a vector of input prices, L is legal costs, and B is a vector of
other characteristics of the producer.
In the supply setting, the bid curves represent equal willingness to
supply. Thus, for each supplier, we can define the function that
solves Equation (6-5) for any specified ir for values of the exogenous
variables appropriate to the supplier. We define P =0(HV.; ir, T,
D(M), L, B) as representing points of equal profit for the landlord.
As before, equilibrium is attained where the bid function is tangent
to the function, since higher 0() areobtained for higher
values of ir while holding all other variables constant. The result is
shown graphically in Figure 6-3. Since(.)representspoints of
constant profit, any particular 0 issimply the total cost function
plus some constant. Therefore, where equilibrium is obtained, mar-
ginal cost must equal the marginal price of HV1.
As in theusu
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Asin the usual competitive model, high profits are assumed to
attract new entrants into the submarket, i.e., additional offerers are
created at a point such as B along the curve. With this,
consumers will resubmit bids so as to be high bidders on only one
unit. This shifts downward, and producers will then obtain an
equilibrium on lower isoprofit contours.
For an individual producer, the equilibrium relations can be shown
more easily by differentiating P(HV.) and and using the
marginal relationships as in Figure 62.C'(HV1)is the marginal cost
of current housing services or marginal current expenditures net of
their effects on future revenues and legal costs. E(HV1) is the total
expenditure for providing current housing service H. Thus,
C'(HV1) =E'(HV1)—D'(M) (6-6)
where, L' (HV1) relates legal costs to the level of services provided and
0
HV,
Note: For definitionof variables, see Figure 6-2 and text.
Figure 6-3.Graphical Solution for Producer.
P(HV,)
—198 Measuring Prices and Quantities in the Housing Market
0




D' (M) relates the future value of the structure to current capital
expenditures on the dwelling unit.
D'(M) is negative; hence —D'(M) can be interpreted as the savings
in depreciation attributable to a unit of maintenance input. The
interpretation of the condition then is that the landlord increases
maintenance up to the point where the marginal evaluation of
quality derived from a unit of maintenance plus the savings in
depreciation equal the price of the maintenance input.
The legal cost function would presumably be a decreasing function
of maintenance. However, the relationship cannot be observed
because we lack essential information on, for example, the number
of cases filed and their cost. Furthermore, there are difficulties in
associating the probabilities of case filing with various levels of
maintenance. We estimate the differential impact of the legal envi-








the legal cost fun
level of service th
Our expectatio
particular price, I











has been to iden
landlord's future
One factor, as d
second important






decline. A final va
categories per low
opportunities con
to allow units to f:
Theconceptualf:
formulate
we provide a descl
















of the legal envi-
to the laws
Habitability Laws and Low-Cost Rental Housing199
implementedin each case. In this sense, the legal cost function
provides the rationale for distinguishing between the two popula-
tions, those that have and those that do not have the particular law,
and predicts the effect of laws on the supply of housing services. The
legal cost function includes all costs imposed by the legal system,
including any penalties that might result from noncompliance. Thus,
the legal cost function reflects the incentives for provision of a higher
level of service than the law might require.
Our expectation is that landlords supply less housing service at any
particular price, if circumstances change so as 'to increase their costs
or to make the supplying of housing a less desirable activity than it
had been. Yet, the effect of the legal cost function itself acts to
increase incentives to provide services. However, the law does affect
the landlord's expectation that his property will continue to be used
as a dwelling by altering its expected future profitability, and
therefore the law affects the expected return to the landlord from
any current maintenance expenditures.
In our investigation, we have so far been attempting to identify
variables that would provide information regarding the comparative
productivity of maintenance expenditure among cities. Our approach
has been to identify the factors that probably have an impact on
landlord's future returns from current maintenance expenditures.
One factor, as discussed above, is the status of housing laws. A
second important factor is the value of land: where land values in a
city are high, one would expect that the remaining life of low-quality
dwellings will be since it is likely that with further deteriora-
tion the structure will become more profitable in other uses. A third
variableisthe relativeprices of dwellings in different quality
categories.This should indicate the reduction in the landlord's
revenues that would occur if the quality of the unit is allowed to
decline. A final variable, the number of vacancies in the lower-quality
categories per low-income renting household, also should indicate the
opportunities confronting a landlord and, therefore, his willingness
to allow units to filter down.
L
IMPLEMENTATION
The conceptual framework that has been presented allows us to
formulate empirical supply and demand relationships. In this section,
we provide a description of the data and basic structural relations of
the model and some results.
Data andStructural Considerations












Sum of annual household rent plus utilities
paid in 1972
Number of rooms in the dwelling
Distance of housing structure to the
center of the SMSA
Structural type
Average household income for a five-year
period, 1968-1972
Average lot value of equivalent sites
inSMSAs
Ratio: tenth percentile rental unit price
to median rental unit price
Median SMSA household income for renters
Total per capita income for the SMSA
Costs of construction for brick-concrete
apartments across cities
Average annual heating cost per room for
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hold descriptions, were taken from the University of Michigan Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (University of Michigan 1972). A
primary advantage of these data over Census data is that the former
provide current housing information .that can be combined with
current legal information. The University of Michigan sample is large
enough to permit separation of low-income households from other
types of households in the rental housing market. The variables are
defined and their sources are given in Table 6-2.'
Several of the variables found in that table are based on observa-
tions for an SMSA. If, for example, several separate households are
Table6-2
Table 6-2.Description and Source of Variables
Name of
Variable Description Source
REDUCT Identifies states with repair and deduct
housing laws
RWHOLD Identifies states with both retaliatory
eviction and withholding laws
RECEIVE Identifies states with receivership laws
VACPER Number of vacancies below median divided
by number of low-income renters
PTAX Property tax per household, average for
the SMSA
RPOP Number of low-income tenants in the SMSA Census (1970)1
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locatedin a particular SMSA, the data recorded for each observation
will be equivalent. In a situation where differences in household rents
in different SMSAs are observed, this is not important. However,
when rental payments by households in one defined SMSA are being
explained by such a measure, the explanatory power of the system
will be small. Since both types of observation are included in the
model's data base, the effects of this insensitivity may be important.
The use of dummy variables related to the law and housing
variables is necessitated by the lack of data on the status, nature, and
effects of laws. In particular, data on enforcement or direct legal
costs and on knowledge of laws are unavailable. Dummy variables are
therefore used to distinguish states and housing locations with
habitability laws from those without such laws. These distinctions
can also be used to indicate places where legal costs are imposed
versus places where they are not, if we assume that knowledge and
enforcement exist and realize that magnitudes of such costs are not
distinguished.
The housing model described in the theoretical section has several
components. The first is an estimation of a household rent equation.
The dependent variable, rental payments (R), is regressed on four
classes of variable:'housing characteristics (HC), demand factors
(DF), market supply factors (SF), and landlord-tenant laws (L), i.e.,
R =f(HC,DF, SF, L) (6-7)
This is a reduced form equation that has a direct relationship to
other structural equations,i.e.,to household consumption and
landlord supply. Since differences between housing payments among
and within cities are included in the data base, the purpose of the DF
and SF variables is to take account of those market variables so that
the estimated value of defined housing characteristics can be aggre-
gated regardless of location.
A second purpose for estimating Equation (6-7) is to identify the
effects of landlord-tenant laws on rental payments and to test the
significance of the estimated coefficientsof the law variables.
Hypotheses related to both the impact and significance of such laws
can be tested in terms of sign and values.
It is interesting to note that if
R = (6-8)
aggregate value of defined housing-characteristics,where B is a
quantity proxy for housing, and R/R is a price measure, there are
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Consumption:RIB =g(R,HDF, L) (6-9)
Supply: R=h(R/R,HSF,L) (6-10)
where HDF =housingdemand factors and HSF =housingsupply
factors. These variables represent subsets of the larger vectors, DF
and SF, in Equation (6-7). A nonsignificant relationship between
rent and law variables may not reflect similar insignificance at the
structural equation level. To guarantee a similar result on both levels
of estimation a perfectly identified or specified system must exist—
an unlikely condition.
The preceding statement isintuitively reasonable because the
dependent variableis rental payments [(R/R)-R]in the rental
payments equation, whereas the dependent variables are RIR and R
in the structural equations. (5
Suppose rental payments for a defined housing quantity are $100
in a location without a tenant-landlord law and $104 in a location
with a law. In a regression, there would be little significance to the
law, but suppose that demanders were unaffected by the law (i.e., no
demand curve shifts occur), but suppliers had increased marginal
costs (reflected in a supply curve shift). In graphical terms, with
inelastic demand, a shift in the supply curve with no shift in
could reflect a significant effect of the law on suppliers and little
effect on rental payments (see Figure
0
Twoother factors that seem important in determining the signifi-
cance of the hypothesized relationship between laws and rent are the
definition of the law variable(s) and the subpopulation of households
being investigated. For instance, if all housing laws were aggregated
and a single law variable defined, different information would result
than if various types of housing laws were defined and investi-
gated.2' Comparison between subpopulations, e.g., aged and young
households, could lead to different results depending on mobility The household's
and other demand factors of the household. This may mean that the have a
household's demand relationship for some groupings accounts for a the household,
dominant part of the rental payment-law relationship. Type of structu
desirable and I
Resultsof the Rent Expenditure Equation a positive relati
On the basis of the current understanding of the low-cost rental Vacancies reflect
market, the following relationships in the reduced form rent equa- demand for dy
tion are expected: variable can be
Property taxes
The number of rooms within a dwelling is expected to be positively should be posit
correlated with annual rent (the larger the dwelling, the higher the Average househo


















































Quantity of housing services, HV1
Figure 6-5:
Thehousehold's distance to the center of the SMSA is expected to
have a negative relationship with rent (the further from the center
the household, the lower the rent).2 2
Type of structure, a dummy variable with zero indicating less
desirable and 1 more desirable dwelling types, is expected to have
a positive relationship with rent.2
Vacancies reflect incentives for providing services as well as the total
demand for dwellings. No particular hypothesis for the sign of this
variable can be made.
Property taxes reflect the value of public expenditures, and thus
should be positively related to rents.
Average household income for 1968-1972 is expected to have a
positive relationship with rent.24204 Measuring Prices and Quantities in the Housing Market
MedianSMSA renter income is used to indicate the relative number
of low-income tenants. No particular hypothesis is available.2
Lot value, intended to reflect the value of property in alternative
uses, is expected to have a positive correlation with rent. High
values for land in other uses would indicate small incentives to
maintain the structure in its present form.
Depreciation, used to index the rate of decline in landlord revenue, is
expected to be positively related to rent. When this ratio is
relatively high, landlords will tend to allow their building(s) to
depreciate, and rents for a given quality level will be higher.
Renting population reflects the scale of the housing service industry
as a whole. No particular sign is predicted.
Construction costsdesigned to reflect differences in rents across
cities, are expected to be positively related to rent.2 6
Averageannual heating cost per dwelling in an SMSA is expected to
be positively related to rent.
Finally, three law variables, indicating the status of habitability laws
in an SMSA in early 1972, are introduced. They are repair and
deduct, a combination of withholding and retaliatory eviction, and
receivership. If enforced, they are likely to impose costs on
landlords and, therefore, are expected to be positively correlated
with rent.2Rather than introducing retaliatory eviction as a
separate law variable, it has been combined with withholding laws.
The withholding-retaliatory eviction variable is a dummy, with 1
indicating that both laws exist and zero indicating otherwise. Our
formulation of the law variables is based on the presumption that
today repair and deduct remedies are not very costly to landlords
and, therefore, furnish little incentive to evict tenants. And, since
unlike complaints under receivership laws, withholding laws tend
to be tenant-initiated, the tenant often requires protection from
retaliatory eviction.
An ordinary least squares regression was estimated, relating rent
(R TIL2) to subsets of independent variables from Table 6-2 for 154
observations in fifty SMSAs. All variables which were not dummies
or indiscrete intervals were put into logarithmic form. The results are
given in Table 6-3.
All variables except LCONCOST (log of CONCOST) have the
expected signs. The sign of CONCOST niay indicate that fewer
demolitions are carried out in places where construction costs are
high. Of the housing characteristics in our equation, number of
rooms per dwelling (LROOM2), structural type (LSTRU2), and
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Table 6-3.Rent Equation (dependent variablea is LRTIL2 = log of rent
plus utilities;N= 154;figures in parentheses are tratios;an asterisk






































for equation 14.6 24
aFor identification of variables, see Table 6-2. The prefix L denotes log form.
significant at the 99 percent level. Lot value (LLOT) was also
significant at the 95 percent level.
Turning next to the main concern of this study, we find that of
the habitability laws, only receivership (RECEIVE) is statistically
significant. The others have negative signs, but their values are quite
small and not significantly different from zero. In the presentation of
the habitability laws it was• pointed out that receivership laws stop
the flow of rental income to the landlord completely and take away
control over his building. Further, because they are initiated by
government, they are backed by its rather large resources. They are,
therefore, the most costly to landlords.
Altogether, the equation taken as a whole is statistically significant
(the F value is 14.06). It has, moreover, a relatively good explanatory
value, accounting for about 61 percent of the variation in rents paid
in 1972 by indigents in our sample. Hence, in 1972, indigents paid206 Measuring Prices and Quantities in the Housing Market
significantly higher rents in a statistical sense in states that had
receivership laws than in those that did not. When the effects of all
independent variables in the equation other than receivership are
held constant, indigent tenants are found to have paid approximately
$192 more in annual rent in 1972 in the presence of receivership
than in its absence (average 1972 annual rent in our sample was
$1,082).2 8
Inthe supply and demand estimation, heating cost and property
taxes were included in the computation of R. For the estimation we
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+ .228 LPTAX + .142 LHEAT
(6-11)
AVEEVAL =RTIL/RHAT (6-12)
In the supply equation, all variables except LCONCOST and repair
and deduct laws have the expected signs (see Table 6-4). LHEA T is
included in the supply equation since it represents a constraint on
the landlord's behavior regarding the amount of housing service he
may provide. Hence, its positive sign would be expected. The
depreciation coefficient indicates that as the severity of the conse-
quences of undermaintenance diminish, so does the willingness to
provide any particular level of service. High lot values predict
diminished willingness to provide service, as do high vacancy rates for
the low-income categories. The income for the SMSA represents a
variety of factors, but can be interpreted much like LRENTY: higher
values for income would tend to indicate that relatively more
higher-quality units are available to filter down. The coefficients of
the law variables indicate a reduced willingness to supply at any given
price in the presence of receivership and withholding. Repair and
deduct has an incorrect sign, but its coefficient is quite small.
In the demand equation, all variables have the expected signs
(Table 6-4). Average evaluations tend to rise with income, and fall
where property taxes or heating costs are high. The price-quantity
relationship isnegative, but actually horizontal for all practical
purposes. The law variable coefficients do indicate that tenants place
some positive evaluation on the laws, as each of these are positive.
In evaluating the costs and benefits of habitability laws, we look at
the vertical shifts of the supply and demand equations that include
those laws. We note that, given the formulation of the supply
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Table 6-4.Supply and Demand Equations (sample size = 154; figures in
parentheses are t ratios; an asterisk denotes significance at the
95 percent level)
Supply Equation; Dependent Variablea= LRHAT
















































F statistic F statistic
for equation 7.1949 for equation 13.1363
is defined by Equation (641); LAVEEVAL, by Equation (6-12) (the prefix L
denotes log form of the variable).
bThe independent variables are defined in Table 6-1; L denotes log form.
shift times the negative reciprocal of the price coefficient. Further,
we note the assumption that the shifts are parallel, an assumption
that would likely be incorrect were it not for the limitation of our
sample to low-income households.
For the one variable that has a significant coefficient in the rent
equation, receivership (RECEIVE), the shift in the supply equation is
larger than the shift in the demand equation. The shift in the former
is about 19 percent, while in the latter it is about 12 percent. Hence,
for receivership, it would appear that the costs outweigh the benefits;208 Measuring Prices and Quantities in the Housing Market
however,itis important to note that these differences are not
significant.3
It is interesting to note that receivership is the only law that seems
to raise rents and has a substantial effect on the supply function. The
explanation may be in the basic distinction between receivership and
the other habitability laws. Receivership is undertaken by state and
local governments; the others are all tenant initiated. Repairs made
under receivership may be quite extensive and may be undertaken
without consideration of profitability or the tenant's desires, thus
imposing large costs on landlords. Repairs under the other habitabil-
ity laws are tenant initiated and, therefore, would not be undertaken
against the interests of the tenant. Tenant-initiated habitability laws
may, therefore, represent a more effective compromise for attaining
an efficient relationship between landlord and tenant.
CONCLUSIONS
Wehave attempted to develop a housing market model that permits
an evaluation of legal sanctions designed to assure indigent tenants
habitable dwellings. Of the major habitability laws, the most power-
ful one (providing for receivership) was found to be associated with a
statistically significant increase in rental expenditures of indigent
tenants. Our data further indicate that costs may outweigh the
benefits imposed on such tenants. Thus, merely extending tenants'
legal rights of action, and thereby shifting some of the power away
from landlords, may not in fact enhance the tenants' welfare. The
cost of providing habitable housing must be borne by someone.
There is evidence that the cost imposed by receivership laws appears
to be largely borne by tenants without their receiving fully compen-
sating benefits.
One striking reason why a receivership law may hurt rather than
help indigent tenants is related to the failure of habitability laws to
provide enhanced financial means to pay for improveçi dwellings.
Thus, to attain their objective of aiding indigent tenants, income
transfers—perhaps in the form of rent subsidies—should supplement
common and state statutory laws that tilt landlord-tenant relations in
favor of the latter.
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1.Censusof Housing,1970 Metropolitan Housing Characteristics, Final
Report HC (2)-i.
2. Housing Act of 1949 §2,63 Stat. 413, as amended, 42 U.S. Code §
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d, 42 U.S. Code §
3. There are some references in Martin (1971).
4. A lease at common law was considered to be the purchase of an interest
in property, subject to the doctrine of caveat emptor. Since the lease agreement
was considered a conveyance of property for a term, the tenant was deemed to
have assumed the obligations and liabilities of ownership.
5. Key cases are Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d. 590, 11 N.W. 2d 404, (1961);
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P. 2d 470 (1969); and Javins v. First
National Realty Coip., 138 U.S. App. D.C. 369, 423 F. 2d 1071, cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925, 91 S. Ct. 186, 27 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1970).
6. The landlord must be notified after the fact, and only after he has failed
to take action within an appropriate time period can the tenant contract for
repair. In most states, the statute permits tenants to deduct no more than One
month's rent to finance repairs.
7. Repair and decuct laws can be applied relatively easily by tenants, since
the laws can be invoked without a prior judicial determination. Should a judicial
proceeding later determine that the tenant was not justified in taking action, he
would merely be liable for the outstanding balance of the rent, i.e., the deducted
repair bill.
8. As long as the violations continue, the welfare recipientis given a
statutory defense to any action or summary proceeding for nonpayment of rent.
9. In utilizing a rent abatement scheme and refusing to pay rent, a tenant
takes the risk that a court may later determine that his actions were unwarranted
because, for example, housing code violations were not substantial enough.
Should that turn out to be the case, the tenant may have to pay the rent due
plus moving expenses, attorney fees, court costs, and even statutory penalties.
10. At the forefront of states legalizing rent strikes are New Jersey and New
York.
11. Although initially designed to make habitability laws work by protecting
tenants who complain about housing code violations, retaliatory eviction
statutes can also be looked upon as devices to assure tenants of continued
tenancy..
12. The interpretation of habitability laws made here is that they are
different from, though not unrelated to, housing codes. Our emphasis here has
been on the transfer of risk and responsibility for maintenance from the tenant
to the landlord. Housing codes, however; disallow rental of low-quality units.
While habitability laws may refer to housing codes as a standard of reasonable-
ness, the housing codes typically represent very high standards, and therefore are
enforced neither as a consequence of habitability laws nor by other means.
Today many housing codes require, for example, that hot water be available at
all taps, usually at 120 degrees Fahrenheit. Many require that every dwelling unit
contain a lavatory, bath/shower, and kitchen sink. Virtually no housing code
allows sharing of kitchens, and very few allow sharing of bathroom facilities
between two units. Most housing codes require heating facilities capable of
maintaining a temperature of 70 degrees Fahrenheit, though some do not require
this between 10:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M. The Uniform Housing Code (prepared
by the International Conference of Building Officials), for example, requires that
every dwelling unit have at least one room with no less than 150 square feet of
floor area. Other habitable rooms except kitchens must have an area of not less210 Measuring Prices and Quantities in the Housing Market
than 70 square feet; and when more than two persons occupy a room used for
sleeping purposes, the required floor area must be increased at a rate of 50
square feet for each occupant in excess of two. It stipulates that habitable
rooms, storage rooms, and laundry rooms shall have a ceiling height of not less
than seven feet measured to the lowest projection from the ceiling. Furthermore,
codes of many cities have stringent light and ventilation provisions. For example,
according to the Uniform Housing Code, all guest rooms, dormitories, and
habitable rooms within a dwelling unit must be provided with natural light by
means of windows or skylights with an area of not less than one-tenth of the
floor area of such rooms, with a minimum of ten square feet.
Many of the housing standards are perhaps so high because vested
interests, e.g., the building iildustry, have often participated in their writing.
Indigent tenants, therefore, often can find that their costs for dwellinge that
meet such inflated standards are very high, and in extreme cases they place a
rather low value on these improvements. The courts have been cognizant of the
possibility of these standards being higher than necessary. For example, in Early
Estates, Inc. v. Housing Board of Review, 174 A. 2d 117 (1961), the court
struck down a portion of an ordinance requiring hot water facilities as being
beyond a city council's power to require facilities needed to make "fit
for human habitation?'
13. Ackerman (1971, p. 1103) states:
Even if the investor originally purchased a building for $100,000 and is
currently earning only one percent or $1000 per year in profit before code
enforcement, the only financially relevant question for him is the value
that the market places on the right to receive $1000. If a purchaser is
willing to buy the future income stream for $5000, abandonment is
irrational unless the anticipated stream of future code costs exceeds this
amount after an appropriate discount rate is applied.
It should be pointed out that in the later parts of his article, Ackerman modifies
his assumptions to allow code enforcement costs to force some dwellings to be
either abandoned or converted to commercial establishments.
14. The differences in estimation procedures between the hedonic price
approach and ours illustrate the contrasts between them. Rosen suggests that
hedonic prices be dealt with by a two-stage estimation process. First, a simple
regression of characteristics on observed prices is carried out using the best-fit.
ting functional form. Next, the resulting characteristics equation is used to
determine a marginal price of each characteristic in each of the observed
commodities. Finally, these marginal price observations are used in the structural
equations for the supply and demand for characteristics. All of this makes good
sense in the usual setting, since the marginal price functions do determine
consumers' and producers' behavior with respect to characteristics.
15. Market prices, which are constants to households, and bid rents or bid
values are equal at optimal utility.maximizing levels of the household. Bid-value
curves can be shown to be downward sloping, as are demand curves. Bid values
are also affected by the level of income and other factors in the market. Finally,
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16.If there was only one set of P for all cities and all individual households
had differing characteristics, the envelope process, which results from optimum
solutions (such as A) by each household, would exactly trace out the supply
(marginal cost curve) of HV1 values.
17. Market segmentation is one direct consequence of the bid-value approach.
This is rationalized later in this paper where market segmentation is by suppliers
and not by geographical subareas, which are often not segmented.
18. Many data sources, such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Federal
Housing Administration, record information on a "standard" or "equivalent"
housing structure or household. These are often inconsistent and rarely reflect
an emphasis on poor households. However, one disadvantage of the University of
Michigan data is that their representativity could not be effectively calculated.
Even if the 5,000 households are representative of the population in general,
there are no guarantees that subpopulations in any one period are representative.
In addition, several periods are examined and employed (for example, in the
determination of household income). The use of time series data also could be
nonrepresentative, but there is no evidence to indicate this.
Where appropriate, data from different sources were examined. In our
selection process, we sought to maximize the inclusion of theoretically relevant
variables without creating serious empirical problems. Of course, no definitive
statement on including data from different sources can be made, since compari-
Sons of biases resulting from omission of variables from the model and from use
of proxy rather than consistent data are not possible.
19. The actual value used for rent was the total contract rent plus payment
forutilities. The cost of utilities was included so that values would be
comparable whether utilities were included in the contract rent or paid
separately.
20. This argument would apply to any factor that had a shift in supply only.
21. As identified in Table 6-2, specification of different laws is possible. Signs
of estimated coefficients and their significance depend on knowledge and
enforcement which could reverse expected signs if such factors do not exist.
Interpretation could also differ depending on whether the landlord or tenant
initiates the proceedings.
22. Distance is an interval variable for distance from the center of the SMSA.
23. More desirable structural types are assumed to be the larger apartment
buildings, where maintenance of low-cost units tends to be better than in
duplexes and single-family dwellings.
24. Average household income rather than a current income measure was
used because current housing expenditures are based on past decision making by
the household in terms of previous as well as current income. It is also preferable
to obtain some measure of permanent income in order to assess a relationship
with a household rental expenditure.
25. Renter income levels reflect demand pressures in the particular housing
market. The more segmented the housing market, the less important the pressure
of other (nonpoor) households on the housing sector examined. Higher income
for other renters may predict higher rents, if markets are not segmented and
others bid higher, or lower rents, if more units can filter down to supply
low-income tenants.
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26.The construction costs variable is needed to describe differences in rents
acrosscities.Such factors as variations in the costs of labor and materials are May.
cited in the literature as important in cross-sectional models on housing. The De Leeuw, Fra
Boeckh index includes such factors. Housing." America
27. Since we do not have enforcement data, we must assume that once a law FHA [Federal I
goes into effect, it provides signals to landlords and tenants, and they react States and Selecte,
rationally to the resulting incentives. 203.
28. Since the regression line passes through the mean values of the variables, Hirsch, Werner
we evaluate the impact of receivership laws at this point: UCLA Law Review
Hirsch,Werner
Given: RENT $1,082 =meanvalue of annual rent Analysis of the
RENT' mean value of annual rent when a receivership law is Observation on th
effect 63, pp. 1099.1 143.
IREM [Institut
RENT" mean value of annual rent in the absence of a receiver- AnalysLs: Apartme
shiplaw National Associatio
REC =0.2662=meanvalue of receivership law King, A.
LRENT" =LRENT—0.17REC; RENT" =1,038. Journey-to.Work, 1
and Consumption.
Bureau of Economi
Since LRENT' —LRENT" =0.17,RENT' =1,230.The difference is $192. Komesar, Neil 29. Given the coefficients in the supply equation and a ceteris paribus Analysis of Housin assumption, we would have for supply, LRHATA +0.261LAVEEVAL, 82, pp. 1175-1207. where A is the intercept of the supply equation. Thus, if the presence of the Martin, Peter. 19 habitability law changes A by xthenthe vertical shift is the inverse of the Muth, Richard I original supply function: LA VEEVAL =(1/0.261LRHAT) —(A/0.261)i.e., Press. —X/O.26l. Thus, the vertical shift of the supply equation is 0.497/0.261 =19 New Jersey Stats
percent for receivership laws. Rosen, Sherwin.
30. Withholding and repair and deduct laws indicate a slightly larger shift for Political Economy,
demand; however, these differences are also not significant, and more important, Rothenberg, Jee
these variables did not show significant effects on rents. New Construction.
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Robert Schafer
Housingcodes and enforcement procedures are typical of
the regulatory approach of lawyers to social problems and
have received widespread attention in the legal literature.
Until recently, economists have shown little interest in integrating
the law and legal institutions into economic analysis. Fortunately,
the subject of law and economics is a growing area of interest to both
lawyers and economists. The Hirsch and Margolis study is part of this
new thrust and isparticularly noteworthy as one of the few
economic analyses and the first empirical study of housing code
enforcement. The repair and deduct, rent withholding, and receiver-
ship laws that they study are methods that the legal profession has
devised to enforce housing codes.
Housing codes and their enforcement mechanisms transfer risks
from the tenant to the landlord. Property law, until recently, has
enforced the principle of cavaet emptor. In fact, it has gone even
further, because covenants to pay rent were found to be enforceable
by the landlord even if he had violated a covenant in the same lease
to maintain the premises. These rules placed the risk of nonpayment
of rent on the landlord and the risk of inferior maintenance (less
than promised) on the tenant. If transaction costs were zero (or even
very small), this allocation of rights would have had little effect on
the ultimate allocation of resources because the parties could
redistribute the rights (Coase 1960). However, transaction costs are
not small, particularly for the tenant. Therefore, these rules could
have a large impact on the operation of the housing market. Housing
codes,repair and deduct laws, rent withholding schemes, rent
215
Ireceivership, and implied warranties of habitability create a new risk
(renting substandard housing) and place this risk on the landlord. If a
landlord persists in renting substandard housing, he (she) may have
to give up income from the property for some period of time.
Furthermore, these laws do not allow a redistribution of these risks,
that is,the landlord cannot return the risk to the tenant via a
covenant in the lease. Here we have two substantially different
allocations of risks; yet we have very little to go by in deciding which
is the best one or whether some intermediate allocation would be
better.
Economists can contribute to the evaluation of a strategy of
housing code enforcement by providing decision makers with guid-
ance in their efforts to answer the following questions:
1. Will code enforcement lead to increased rents?
2. Will code enforcement put people out in the street?
3. What will happen if codes are selectively enforced in only part of
the housing market?
4. What are the income distribution implications of code enforce-
ment?
5. What are the welfare gains and losses?
There are, of course, several other administrative (including fairness)
and political issues that must be studied in an evaluation of code
enforcement. However, I discuss only the five itemized issues.
The teaching of economic theory is that when price falls below
average variable cost, the firm will shut down or abandon the housing
(Miller 1973). A simple set of cost and demand curves serves as an
illustration. Following the work of Olsen (1969), we define an
"unobservable theoretical entity," housing service per time period,
which is assumed to be homogeneous. This facilitates the conceptual
comparison of different dwelling units. Hirsch and Margolis make the
same assumption. It is important to be aware of the limitations
inherent in this approach; Olsen's framework ignores the durability
of the stock, limitations on the extent to which existing units can be
altered, indivisibility, neighborhood quality, the nonmarket provision
of certain attributes of the housing bundle, and the spatial distribu-
tion of housing.
According to this approach, the number of units of housing
services per dwelling unit per time period (q) increases with the
quality of the dwelling unit. Let p be the price per unit of housing
service per time period. Then Figure 6A-1 represents the cost curves
of a firm and a tenant's (or the average tenant's) demand curve for
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market would produce SS units of housing services per time period
per dwelling unit for a price of PSS times SS. S indicates the
minimum amount of housing services permitted by the housing code.
If the code is enforced, the firm in Figure 6A-1 will abandon the
building. If the minimum required by the code were to the left of SS,
then this firm would not be affected. If it were between SS and A,
the firm would continue to operate in the short run, but at a loss. As
Komesar (1973) points out, the cost curves change with time (all
costs become variable in the long run), and the firm may eventually
close down. If the code requirement were to the right of A, the firm
would abandon the housing and some people would end up on the
street, assuming that the code includes occupancy criteria that are
also enforced. We will return to this issue below.
The profitability of slum housing is a popular stereotype that is
based more on mythology than fact.If slum landlords earned
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therewould be no abandonment. This is readily illustrated for the
case of a monopolist whose marginal revenue curve is below the
demand curve. The point of production would then be a q less than
SS.Thenany code that required a minimum above this point but less
than or equal to SScouldbe enforced without any effect on the
firm's behavior (Miller 1973).
The empirical evidence on rates of return to slum ownership is
mostly indirect. Researchers examine the concentration of ownership
and if the ownership is not concentrated, draw an inference of
competitive returns. Sternlieb's survey (1966) of rental properties in
Newark showed that 42.8 percent of the surveyed parcels were
owned by persons who owned no other rental properties; 21.2
percent, by owners of one or two other rental properties; 10.9
percent, by owners of three to six parcels; and only 15.8 percent, by
owners of more than twelve other parcels. Ackerman (1971) points
out a difficulty with this data; the shares are in terms of parcels and
not dwelling units. This is a valid criticism, but at the same time it
does not justify complete dismissal of the implication that the slum
housing market is competitive.
A similar conclusion was reached by Peterson et al. (1973) in a
study of four Providence neighborhoods. The neighborhoods repre-
sented three different market conditions, which were defined in
terms of relative market prices and price trends. In the "blighted"
neighborhood they found that 80.0 percent of the properties were
owned by persons who owned no other property; and only 1.5 per-
cent, by owners of five or more properties. As is indicated in the
tabulation below (Peterson 1973, p. 56), this pattern remained vir-





5 or More Properties
Upward transitional 78.5 3.3
Upward transitional 83.2 1.6
Downward transitional 85.8 1.0
Blighted 80.0 1.5
Total 82.2 1.6
In this study, which covered ten cities, they concluded (p. 55) that:
The lack of concentration of ownership in the low.incóme housing market
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byseveral large slum lords. In other cities, the large slum lord was often
talked about, and certainly individuals who owned several thousand units
exist, but in each city we also found and talked to large numbers of
smaller investors in blighted areas, including many black real estate
operators, who specialized in buying and managing a limited number of
low-income properties. While this topic deserves additional study, we
conclude that there is considerable evidence that low-income areas are not
the sole province of a [sic] few large investors.
Some of my own research at the National Bureau of Economic
Research contradicts Ackerman's criticism that the previous studies
dealt with the ownership of parcels and not dwelling units. For three
neighborhoods in the city of Pittsburgh, the share of parcels held by
small owners (fewer than four parcels) is just about the same as their
share of dwelling units. In Table 6A-1, the data on ownership for
each of these neighborhoods are summarized. Small owners owned
68.9 percent of the parcels and 63.1 percent of the dwelling units in
the three neighborhoods. Large owners (more than twelve parcels)
owned 11.5 percent of the parcels and 18.8 percent of the units.
These data suggest that parcel ownership is a reasonable proxy for
dwelling unit ownership in studying market power or concentration
in the housing market.
Comparisons of rates of return on investment in real estate versus
returns on other investments would throw some light on the extent
of abnormal profits in housing markets. A few authors have at-
tempted such studies with mixed success. Sternlieb (1966) found
rates of return that averaged 8 to 12 percent for 32 slum properties
in Newark. Sporn (1950) found a rather high average rate of
return—19.8 percent—for 45 parcels in Milwaukee. These figures do
not exhibit the consistently high returns that the popular belief in















Medium 11.5 15.1 37.5 32.5 15.8 10.7 19.7 18.1
Large 11.5 17.0 6.3 10.0 15.8 26.8 11.5 18.8
All Sizes100.0 100.0100.0 100.0 100.0100.0 100.0100.0
Sample size26 53 16 40 19 56 61 149
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theslumlord suggests. Stemlieb's figures for Newark are comparable
to returns on corporate bonds. In addition, in none of these studies
have the risk differentials been systematically assessed in relation to
the rates of return.
There is no reason to believe that the minimum housing services
required by the code will be related to the firm's cost curves in any
specific way. At a minimum, we would expect some distribution of
the firm's cost curves about the code requirement. In addition, the
empirical evidence is inconsistent with very sizable abnormal profits.
As a result, some firms would be expected to abandon dwelling units.
Then, one of the important empirical questions is: How many
dwelling units might be abandoned under code enforcement?
Abandonment could also be avoided if tenants were willing to pay
the price demanded by landlords for providing code-standard hous-
ing. As was shown in Figure GA-i, for the low-income housing
market, the interaction of supply and demand for housing services
per dwelling unit (q) results in a housing quality that is below code
standards (SS). If a code is enforced at S, the supply price per unit of
q will increase or remain the same depending on the price elasticity
of the supply of q. However, the supply price of the dwelling unit (p
x q) will always increase, even with a perfectly elastic supply of q,
because q is being forced up. Households will have to choose
between paying this increase and living on the street. This choice is
dipicted in Figure 6A-2 in terms of a budget transformation line (TB)
and indifference curves (I and I'). Most of the budget line is curved
because the supply price per unit of q may change with the amount
of q. If a housing code is enforced at a minimum amount of q equal
to S, the household has two choices: pay the higher price and
consume S or move to the street. The budget transformation line has
been drawn with a vertical portion (line segment AB) that represents
no cash expenditures for housing; this segment amounts to living on
the street. If the indifference curve that passes through the point on
the budget transformation line at S does not also intersect AB, then
the household will choose to pay the higher price of a dwelling unit
with S units of housing service per time period. If the indifference
curve intersects AB, the household will choose the street. If the
code's minimum q is above T, the household will be forced to the
street because its income would be insufficient to pay for this much
housing. The demand curve that is implied by the choices under code
enforcement has a kink at q equal to S. For q's that are greater than
S, the demand curve is unchanged. The demand curve below S,
however, disappears and is replaced by a vertical line rising from the
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result,price elasticities of demand in the low-income submarket
should be less elastic in the presence of code enforcement.
In the preceding analysis, it has been assumed that the code, which
includes occupancy standards, is enforced throughout the housing
market. If that is not the case, then households will have a third
option—moving to an area where the code is not enforced. They
would undoubtedly elect this option whenever it is available because
it would maximize their satisfaction, i.e., restore them to a tangency
position. Under a fully enforced housing code the household would
be obliged to sacrifice some satisfaction. This is a deadweight welfare
lossto societyunless the other members of the society reap
substantial gains in their utility because no one lives in substandard
housing (Daly and Giertz 1972, Aaron and von Furstenberg. 1971).
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Inpractice, it is likely that the parts of the housing code covering
facilities and the level of maintenance will be enforced while the
occupancy restrictions, e.g., persons per room, will be relaxed. If that
happens, tenants will have the option of doubling up in dwelling
units that meet code standards except for the occupancy restrictions.
This alternative will undoubtedly appeal to many tenants. As in the
case of enforcement in only part of the geographical area comprising
the submarket, partial enforcement of the code provisions will lead
tenants to take advantage of the loophole to move toward their
higher levels of precode satisfaction.
In view of the preceding discussion and review of empirical
evidence, economists would be inclined to answer the five questions
posed earlier as follows: Rents will probably increase, but the
amount of the increase will depend on the price elasticity of the
supply of housing services per dwelling unit. Although the supply
will probably decline, the result will depend on the extent of
abnormal profits and the choice of households between accepting
code housing or living on the streets. If codes are selectively enforced
in only some geographical parts of the market, code enforcement
will probably have little effect on households other than generating
a move to a new area, and might result in the abandonment of some
physical capital in the area of enforcement (Ingram and Kain 1973).
The tenants will bear the burden of rent increases above any
abnormal profits. Any income redistribution will be from landlords
to tenants, but only to the extent of abnormal profits. After the
abnormal profits are absorbed, the tenants will suffer a deadweight
welfare loss. There are better ways of achieving income redistribution
objectives (Komesar 1973, Posner 1972).If, however, Congress
decides to enact and fund a housing allowance program, tenants
would have the income to pay the increased cost associated with
code enforcement, i.e., a national housing allowance would make an
effective code enforcement program possible.
Ackerman (1971) has presented an argument that under certain
circumstances, which he seems to believe are highly probable, rents
will not increase, supply will not decline, and housing code enforce-
ment will be a better income redistribution device than a negative
income tax. Although he carefully discusses his assumptions, the
limits of his conclusions are often lost in the midst of a lengthy brief
on behalf of his general conclusion. A comment by Komesar. (1973)
undermines much of Ackerman's analysis, especially on the issue of
the preferred measures of income redistribution. However, Komesar's
attachment to the long-run supply curve is as unrealistic as Acker-
man's assumptions. Studies of the housing market suggest that the
n
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price elasticity of supply is more inelastic than elastic. At the same
time, it is not inelastic enough to justify Ackerman's assumptions,
which amount to an extremely inelastic supply curve. Muth's analysis
(1960) indicates that the housing market as a whole requires six
years to absorb 90 percent of a shift in demand. De Leeuw and
Ekanem (1971) have estimated the price elasticity of the supply of
housing services per dwelling unit to be 0.3 to 0.7. There is nothing
paradoxical or surprising about Ackerman's conclusion, because it
follows directly from his assumptions. In essence he assumes that
there are abnormal profits in Slumvile and that, for nearly all firms,
is greater than average variable cost at the point on the firm's
cost curves that corresponds to code-standard housing. Whether
Ackerman's scenario is correct is an empirical question. What are the
profit levels in the low-income housing market? What are the price
elasticities of supply and demand?
Hirsch and Margolis present an elegant theoretical discussion, but
it does not add to the reader'sunderstanding of the specification of
the estimated equations. Their central purpose is to analyze whether
the reallocation (and creation) of risks due to habitability laws shifts
the supply and demand curves. The potential contribution of the
study lies in its empirical analyses.
The theoretical discussion adds confusion rather than clarity, since
itis a questionable modification of Rosen's analysis (1974) of
hedonic price indexes. The difference between the two formulations
arises from the addition of supply (e.g., the construction cost index),
demand (e.g., household income and median income for renters in
the SMSA), and legal variables to the housing characteristics normal-
ly found in an hedonic price index. Hirsch and Margolis justify this
on grounds that their observations are distributed across many
different cities, each of which may be facing very different supply
and demand equations. This justification seems to be relevant for the
SMSA-level variables but not for each household's income (average
over 1968-1972).
The coefficients of the housing characteristics (number of rooms,
distance to the central business district, structural type, property tax,
and heating cost) are employed as the implicit prices of these
attributes to calculate a measure of the amount of housing services in
each dwelling unit (R). The latter is then used as the quantity
variable in the supply and demand equations. The five housing
characteristics are an inadequate description of the attributes normal-
ly associated with housing. There are no characteristics that capture
neighborhood attributes or level of public services or building
attributes—lot size, floor area, kitchen facilities, heating systems, and224 Measuring Prices and Quantities in the Housing Market
bathrooms, to name but a few. Property taxes per household for the
SMSA is a wholly inadequate representation of the amount of public
services associated with any particular dwelling unit, since services
vary widely between governments and even within jurisdictions.
There is also no measure of the quality dimension, even though the
Michigan Survey contains information on the repair needs of each
dwelling unit. That measure, although inadequate in terms of the
heterogeneous nature of housing, would have been better than none.
The interpretation of structural type as a cost-related variable instead
of a housing attribute such as density indicates an inadequate
understanding of the hedonic technique. The limited characterization
of the housing bundle makes the use of these coefficients to
construct a quantity measure for housing highly questionable. Such
useisfurther questionable on conceptual grounds because the
inclusion of the so-called supply and demand variables obfuscates the
meaning of the housing characteristic coefficients (Rosen 1974). It
may be the case that the operation of housing markets in different
SMSAs can only be effectively examined by estimating a separate
hedonic price index for each SMSA. The estimate could be made
from micro data, using the Public Use Sample from the 1970 Census.
Although the Michigan Survey is more recent, a check of the states
that have receivership laws shows that all of these laws were in force
prior to the 1970 Census. The laws were enacted in 1962 (two
states), 1965, 1966, 1968, and 1969. Therefore, the Michigan Survey
does not have a major advantage over the Census for the most
important legal variable. A sample of 154 observations is too small to
study what amounts to fifty different housing markets.
The legal variables consist of three dummies, one each for states
that have repair and deduct laws, rent-withholding and retaliatory
eviction laws, and rent receivership laws. Receivership laws are
believed to be the most effective enforcement measure of the three,
and rent-withholding laws are believed to be more effective than
repair and deduct laws. Only six of the twenty-five states in the
sample have rent receivership laws: Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, New Jersey, and New York. It is quite possible that these
dummy variables could represent other factors, such as urbanization
or a propensity to pass progressive social legislation, that those states
have in common. With these reservations in mind, Hirsch and
Margolis estimate that tenants pay significantly higher rents in states
that have rent receivership laws. The other two legal variables have
negative signs and are not statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. Although Hirsch and Margolis describe their rent equation as
being in reduced form, it is not clear what it is a reduced form of. It
certainly is nota
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certainlyis not a reduced form of the supply and demand equations.
As a result, the meaning of these estimates and their bearing on an
evaluation of housing code enforcement remains unclear.
One would hope that the supply and demand equations would
provide more useful information. However, they are beset with
specification problems, and perform unsatisfactorily. The proxy for
quantity is the hedonic value (R) and that for price is the ratio of the
actual rent to the hedonic value (R/R). As in the case of the hedonic
equation, the supply and demand equations differ in substantial
respects from those recommended by Rosen (1974).
The supply and demand equations are asserted to be well-defined
structural equations. If we accept the Hirsch and Margolis proxies for
quantity and price, we would expect two structpral equations that
had quantity as the dependent variable, namely, R =f(RIR,HDF, L)
for demand and R =k(R/R,HSF, L) for supply. Instead, Hirsch and
Margolis switch R with RIB only in the demand equation. They are
not the first to do this; others have entertained similar specifications
with no more explanation than that "it is convenient" (de Leeuw
• and Ekanem 1971). It may be convenient, but why should this be
the specification? It will affect the empirical estimates because in one
case the sum of the squared errors of quantity (R) is minimized, and
in the other, that of price (R/R). These procedures will give different
estimates of the price elasticity of demand. In the Hirsch-Margolis
formulation this price elasticity is the inverse of the coefficient of B,
and the coefficients of HDF and L variables would have to be
transformed (multiplied by the negative of the price elasticity) to
arrive at estimates of their effects on demand. A further estimation
problem arises because .R appears in the dependent variable and one
• of the independent variables in both equations.
In appropriately specified supply and demand equations, the legal
variables contribute to an evaluation of housing code enforcement by
providing information on the allocation of risks between landlords
and tenants.If code enforcement shifted risks from tenants to
landlords, the supply curve would be expected to shift to the left
(negative coefficients for the legal variables in the supply equation),
and the demand curve would be expected to shift to the right
(positive coefficients for the legal variables in the demand equation).
The shift in the supply curve would probably not be parallel; the
curve would shift further at lower values of B than at higher ones
because code enforcement will have less effect on the risks of
supplying housing above the, code standard. The Hirsch-Margolis
estimates indicatethat the supply curve shiftsas expected in
response to rent receivership and rent-withholding laws but shifts in
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the opposite direction for repair and deduct laws. The legal coeffi..
cients in the Hirsch-Margolis "demand" equation must be multiplied
by the negative of the inverse of the coefficient of R to obtain the
coefficients corresponding to the standard demand and supply
equations. As a result, the legal variables would have the expected
signs and would represent the expected shifts. All the coefficients of
the legal variables in the supply equations are highly insignificant by
conventional statistical tests, and the repair and deduct variable is
insignificant in the demand equation.
The estimate of the price elasticity of supply (0.2613) compares
reasonably well with prior estimates. At the same time, I am hard
pressed to explain the role of LSMSA Y (average income for the
SMSA) in a supply equation. This demand variable appears to be in
the wrong place; yet it plays a prominent role in the estimated
equation. Such an income variable would be appropriate in the
demand equation, but there is none there, (A measure of each
household's income, however, is appropriately included.)
The demand equation is beset by a similar problem of suitability:
LHEAT (average annual heat cost per structure) is a prominent, but
inappropriate, variable in that equation. LHEAT could be interpreted
as a proxy for climatic variations in demand, hut temperature would
be better suited for the purpose. As a supply variable, LHEAT could
represent an input cost differential or some regionally varying
constraint on the production function. In the former role, we would
expect a negative sign. The estimate, however, is positive, and Hirsch
and Margolis explain that LHEAT is a constraint on the amount of
service a landlord can provide.
These empirical and conceptual inadequacies in the estimated
equations and the statistically weak and inconsistent results for the
legal variables cast considerable doubt on the reliability of the
estimates. I certainly do not have a great deal of confidence in the
comparison of costs and benefits. In fact, the comparison is troubling
because itis inappropriately framed in terms of a cost-benefit
analysis at the same time that such important elements as adminis-
trative costs are ignored. The shifts are interesting, but they do not
contain enough information to evaluate housing code enforcement.
In summary, the important empirical questions remain without
any clear-cut answers. The most that can be said is that the
Hirsch-Margolis results are inconsistent with Ackerman's world be-
cause the supply curve shifts more than the demand curve for rent
receivership, which is the most effective enforcement procedure of
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